In this paper we provide a simple locally interactive dynamic model of technology choice and output production. We assume a Cobb-Douglas type production function for two available technologies. The returns to technology 0 are not affected by local spillovers. Technology 1 is more costly, as there is an overhead cost, but it has a higher marginal productivity with respect to net capital. The superiority of technology 1 positively and monotonically depends on the fraction of neighbours using it. We study the aggregate process of technology choices in a model with countably many firms and repeated choices. The model explains: (i) persistent aggregate fluctuations in the presence of only idiosyncratic shocks, (ii) cross sectional heterogeneity along the dynamics and (iii) the possibility of multiple equilibria. The main contribution of the paper over the existing literature is that the model explains the endogeneous formation of large areas, homogeneous in terms of technology choice and output level, that look stationary along the dynamics.
Introduction
A large body of recent literature on economic growth has focused on three important issues, both at an empirical and at a theoretical level (see e.g. the recent work of Durlauf and Quah (1998) ). First, economies display large, persistent aggregate fluctuations, although the empirical evidence casts doubt on the possibility that a large fraction of sectorial comovement is attributable to aggregate shocks (see e.g. Haltiwanger (1990,1996) or Horwath and Verbrugge (1999) ). Second we observe a high degree of cross sectional heterogeneity along the dynamics. In particular observationally similar economies that are geographically distant may experiment substantially different growth path (see e.g. Durlauf (1993 Durlauf ( , 1994 ). Third, the differences in output level and growth across different regions suggest the possibility of multiple equilibria (for alternative explanation of multiple equilibria, see e.g. Cooper and John (1988) , Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) , Azariadis and Drazen (1990) ). The first issue has indeed received substantial attention, starting from the pioneering work of Jovanovic (1987) , who shows how idiosyncratic shocks can generate aggregate fluctuations even in a infinitely lived economy. The literature on coordination failure (e.g., Cooper and John (1988) ), can provide an explanation for the existence of multiple steady state, but it fails to provide an explanation for the observed cross sectional heterogeneity around a given equilibrium.
A successful attempt at providing a joint explanation to the three issues above has been recently based by local interacting models (e.g. Durlauf (1993 Durlauf ( , 1994 , Brock and Durlauf (2000) , Verbrugge (2000 Verbrugge ( ,2003 ). Basically, the presence of localized technological complementarities creates intertemporal linkages across the production functions of neighboring industries, so that shocks to one industry lead to spillovers effect to the neighboring industries and then to the neighbors of the neighboring industries. Such propagation mechanism explain both aggregate fluctuation as well as cross sectional heterogeneity. Furthermore, as shown in Durlauf (1993) , when these localized technological complementarities are particularly strong, multiple equilibria and so nonergodic behavior arise. 1 This paper proposes a simple, locally interactive model that helps analyzing the three issues mentioned above. The paper contributes to the existing literature modeling locally interaction by providing some analytical results on the rate at which clusters grow for the particular case outlined below.
In the model there are only idiosyncratic shocks, in the form of random times at which the capital of a firm, which is the only factor of production, becomes obsolete.
1 Models of local interaction and spillovers from neighbors as an explanation for multiple equilibria in human capital accumulation or ghettos formations have also been proposed (see e.g. Durlauf 1994, Brock and Durlauf (2000) and references therein). For example Bala and Sorger (2001) show that local spillovers affect the return from investment in education, leading to multiple equilibria characterized by different social stratification in terms of workers and managers. A local interactive model that explains formation and persistence of ghettos (consistent with the history of US black ghettos) is recently proposed by Möbius (1999) .
Such idiosyncratic shocks are able to reproduce aggregate persistent fluctuations. As in Durlauf (1993) , the driving force of the model is the presence of localized technological complementarities across enterprises. When, at a random time, capital becomes obsolete, the firm has the opportunity of revising its technology. There are in fact two available, non convex, technologies, say 0 and 1. Technology 1 is more efficient, in terms of marginal productivity, but it is also more costly, therefore it is chosen whenever its efficiency advantage is high enough to compensate its higher cost. The degree of superiority of technology 1, other things being equal, depends on the number of neighbors currently employing it. Thus, the higher is the number of firms currently using the efficient technology, the higher is the chance that a higher number of firms will adopt it in the future. This generates aggregate fluctuations. The localized nature of spillovers also reproduces cross sectional heterogeneity. When it suffices less than half of the neighbors using the efficient technology in order for an enterprise to choose it, then there exists a unique equilibrium, called the high equilibrium, in which all firms will eventually adopt the efficient technology. This is somewhat reminiscent of the case of weak complementarities in Durlauf (1993) . On the other hand, when it requires more than half of the neighbors using the efficient technology in order for an enterprise to choose it, then there exists a unique equilibrium too, called the low equilibrium, in which no firm will eventually adopt the efficient technology. More articulate dynamics as well as multiple equilibria occur when it requires exact half of the neighbors using the efficient technology in order for an enterprise to choose it. In this case we may have multiple long run equilibria, either degenerate on the same technology or non degenerate, in which both technologies co-exist. This may lead to a situation where clusters persist indefinitely. In the case where the returns of the two technologies are exactly the same when they are adopted by an equal number of neighbors, we are able to give formal results on the dynamics as well as on the rate of growth of clusters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the optimization problem of the firm. Section 3.1 describes the aggregate process of technology choice in the case in which both technologies yield the same profit when they are adopted by an equal number of firms within a neighborhood. In particular we show that the process of technological choice can be seen as either a linear or a nonlinear voter model. Relying on some of the results available in the probability literature for the linear and the nonlinear voter model, Section 3.2 describes the asymptotics and the dynamics of the aggregate process in the symmetric case. Section 4 describes the asymptotics and the dynamic behavior of the aggregate technology process when the optimal adoption of, say, technology 1 requires fewer than half of the neighboring firms to use technology 1. A small simulation exercise is provided in Section 5. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
The Model
There is a countable number of identical firms 2 , living on a one dimensional lattice, Z. Each firm is characterized by its location on the lattice, that is firm x is located at x ∈ Z. Firms cannot change location. Each of them produces a homogeneous good, which may be used either as capital or paid out as dividends. Firms can choose between two different technologies, say Technology 0 and Technology 1, both of them are strictly concave in capital. The aggregate output is determined by local interaction among different firms. In particular the choice of the technology is affected by the number of neighboring firms adopting that technology. The returns from technology 0 are independent of the number of neighboring firms using it, while the return from technology 1 increases with the number of neighbors using it. As most of the asymptotic results in the next session, rely on the properties of the voter model, they are not robust to change in the network structure, thus the assumption that sites live a long a line is somewhat crucial.
At time 0, each firm receives an identical endowment of capital, technologies are randomly (and independently) assigned to firms. There are no financial constraints, so that each firm can buy the optimal amount of capital. Given the initial endowment of capital, production occurs in continuous time. However capital gets obsolete at a random Poisson time with intensity parameter equal to one, i.e. the expected life is one. The random times at which capital becomes obsolete are independent across firms. When capital becomes obsolete the firm has the opportunity of revising its technology choice and then begins to produce the homogeneous good until capital gets obsolete again. Because of the Poisson assumption, the probability that more than one firm reconsider its technology in the same instant of time is zero.
Notation and Set up
. . denotes the location of the firm on the lattice, and so x ∈ Z. l = 0, 1 denotes the technology chosen. τ x i denotes the random time at which firm x reconsider the technology chosen for the i − th time. Thus τ x i+1 − τ x i denotes the (random) time elapsed between the i − th and the i + 1 − th time firm x can reconsider its production technology. 
Assuming that the price of capital is equal to the price of output and these are both equal to one, for any realization of τ x i and for all possible realizations, firm x solves the following profit maximization problem,
Note that conditional on a realization of τ x i (and for all realizations), the only random element in (1) is τ x i+1 , that is the time at which the new stock of capital will become obsolete. Note also that, when choosing a technology, a firm can only observe current technological choices made by her neighboring firms, but cannot anticipate future choices.
Assumptions

A1-Random Times
∀i, x τ x i+1 −τ x i are identically and independently distributed, with Pr
Also τ x i and τ n m are independent ∀i = m and/or x = n.
A1 ensures that at any instant of time the probability that more than one firm reconsider its technology choice is zero, also at any instant, each firm has a positive probability of reconsidering its technology. It also ensures that the average life of capital is equal to one. As τ x i and τ n m are independent ∀i = m and/or x = n, the random life of capital plays the same role of the iid random idiosyncratic shocks in Durlauf's model.
A2-Technology
and is monotonically increasing in its argument.
For sake of simplicity, and in order to get more easily interpretable results, we assume a Cobb-Douglas type production function. Technology 0 is not affected by the neighbors choice. Technology 1 is characterized by an higher marginal productivity, with respect to the net capital K − F. Note that F is fixed and does not depend on the amount of capital available, that is for any level of capital K, only K − F is "useful" as input of production. 3 The superiority of technology 1 positively and monotonically depends on the fraction of neighbors using it. As the superior technology is more costly, it will be adopted only if an enough high fraction of neighbors is employing it. As each site, when revising its technology choice, does not take into account the effect of its decision on neighboring site, the model is myopic.
A3-Initial conditions
At time 0 each firm receives an identical endowment of capital, say K x (0) = K(0), ∀x. Then each firm takes an independent draw from a uniform [0, 1] random variable, if the realization of firm x draw is equal to or smaller than θ, θ ∈ (0, 1), then firm x chooses technology 1, if instead firm x draws a realization larger than θ, then it uses technology 0.
A3 rule out the possibility of a degenerate initial state. It also ensures that the probability measure governing the initial configuration of technologies is a Bernoulli product measure , and so it is translation invariant, i.e. independent of the specific site.
Heuristics
At time 0 firm x receives its initial endowment of capital, say K x (0) = K(0) ∀x, with probability θ (resp. (1 − θ)), 0 < θ < 1, firm x begins to produce with technology 1 (resp. 0). At (random) times τ x i i = 1, 2, . . . the initial stock of capital becomes obsolete and so firm x can reconsider its choice of technology and optimal stock of capital.
For any given realization of τ x i and for the neighbors technology choices, the only random element in the maximization problem above is τ x i+1 , that is the time in which the new capital stock will become obsolete. However given A1 we have that E τ x i+1 − τ x i = 1, ∀i, so that the profit maximization (1) can be rewritten as
In order to solve the maximization in (2), the firm first computes the optimal level of capital and so the maximum profit corresponding to technology 0 and 1 and then chooses the technology which ensures the highest of the two maximum profits. Given A2, simple arithmetic shows that, when using technology 0 the optimal level of capital and the corresponding profit are given by
3 In other words, F has been modeled as an overgead cost, as in Durlauf (1993) .
and when using technology 1,
and so when the superiority of technology 1 is high enough to compensate its higher cost.
Thus ∀x, i and for
given (3) and (4), the output of firm x grows accordingly to either
as each firm chooses the technology to employ in an optimal way. Also note that, because of A2,
is an increasing function of η x,i . In particular, while the output produced according technology 0 can takes only one possible values, the output produced according to technology 1 can take different values, depending on the neighboring configuration.
We now want to analyze the behavior of aggregate output over time. Let Y t,t+1 be the aggregate output over the period (t + 1) − t, e.g. the yearly GNP. As the number of firms at different sites is countable, we can define
where Y x,t,t+1 is say the yearly output of the firm at site x. Of course this depends on the spillover effect from the neighbors and the technology used in that period. Suppose that firm x capital stock becomes obsolete once in that period, say at τ
for l, m = 0, 1. And so
Thus the aggregate output can show cyclical behavior because of two factors: (i) the randomness in the capital life at various sites, (ii) the changing of configurations of technology across sites. It should be noted that in this context the random times at which capital becomes obsolete at different sites play the role of exogenous idiosyncratic shocks. As firms choose the technology in an optimal way, Y x,0 (t) < Y x,1 (t), and so hereafter a configuration where all firms use technology 1 will be called the "high equilibrium", while a configuration in which all firms use technology 0 will be called the "the low equilibrium". In the sequel we shall also need the following additional assumption, A4: Π * 0 > Π * 1,x (0) and Π * 0 < Π * 1,x (1) where Π * 0 and Π * 1,x (0) are defined as (3) and (4), with (4) evaluated at η x,i = 0 and η x,i = 1 respectively.
A4 ensures that either a configuration of all 1 or all 0 are absorbing states. Hereafter, for notational simplicity define
and note that C(A 0 , F, α) is monotonically increasing in A 0 and F, while it is increasing in α for low values of α and decreasing for high values. Summarizing each firm behavior is characterized as follows: F, α) , then firm x may choose either technology.
Consider the latter case and let δ be that value of η x,i such that A 1 (δ) = C(A 0 , F, α), so that δ is an implicit, nonlinear function of A 0 , α and F. Needless to say, there may exists different combination of F, A 0 and α producing the same value for δ. As we shall see in the Section below, the dynamics as well the asymptotics of the process differ in a substantial way depending on whether δ = 1/2 or δ = 1/2. In the former case, i.e. δ = 1/2, if the two technologies are adopted by an equal number of neighbors, they both yield exactly the same expected payoff to a firm evaluating adoption. The second case, i.e. δ = 1/2, identifies a situation where one technology benefits relatively more from the local externality. For example, if δ < 1/2, technology 1 is better than technology 0 whenever at least δ% of the neighboring firms adopt it.
The model outlined above is closely related to Durlauf's (1993) . In particular, we borrow the production structure (Assumption A3), and the idea of spillover across neighboring firms. However, there are two key difference. First, in Durlauf the dynamics evolves in discrete time; at any period t = 1, 2, ... all industries revise the technology choice based on the previous period's neighbors choices and on an idiosyncratic shock. In the present context, instead dynamics evolves in continuous time, and sites revise their technology choice according to Poisson random times (see assumption A1) which plays the same role as Durlauf's idiosyncratic shocks. This structure allows to obtain more informative results about cluster formation along the dynamics. Second, in Durlauf model what matters are the lower and upper bound of the probability with which one site chooses technology 1 whenever some neighbors (no matter how many) have chosen technology zero in the previous period. When the lower bound is high (weak complementarities case), then ergodic behavior arises, when the upper bound is low (strong complementarities) multiple equilibria arise. In our context instead, whenever it takes less than half (more than half) of neighbors to choose technology 1, convergence to a high (low) equilibrium arises. In this sense, multiple equilibria may be less frequent in our set-up. Finally, it should be pointed out, that in Durlauf's framework neighbors are defined in terms of similar industry, while in our context neighbors are defined in terms of a specific metric on the real line. Given that, our results hinge on the fact that sites lie along a real line and are not robust in general to a different spatial/network structure.
3 The case of δ = 1/2.
The Aggregate Process of Technological Choices.
In the symmetric case, it turns out that the characterization of the limit behavior of the aggregate process of technological choice depends crucially on the specific tie breaking rule adopted whenever a firm is indifferent between the two technologies. In fact, with reference to case c. in the previous section (a. and b. left unaltered), we distinguish three possibilities:
B1 the firm takes a draw from a uniform random variable on [0, 1], if the realization is equal or smaller than 1/2, it chooses technology 1, otherwise it chooses technology 0.
B2 the firm switches technology.
B3 the firm keeps the technology currently used. We assume that within the same model, all firms adopt the same breaking rule (either B1, B2 or B3). Hence, we rule out the possibility that firms at different sites can follow different rules, or the possibility that a given firm chooses a different rule in different points in time.
For h = 1, 2, 3 let η Bh x (t) denotes the technology used by the firm at site x at time t, for the case in which all firms follow rule Bh. The corresponding aggregate process describing the (aggregate) configuration of technologies at time t is denoted by η Bh (t) = (η Bh x (t), x ∈ Z), and we denote the aggregate processes of technologies
Hereafter let | · | denotes the Euclidean norm and # denotes the cardinality of a set. In the sequel we shall use the following fact. PROOF: (i) η B1 is an interactive particle Markov process evolving on {0, 1} Z . Given A1 and A2, any time the firm can revise the technology choice, it looks at its two neighbors. Suppose that the firm was using technology 0, if no neighbor uses 1 (A1 rules out the possibility that at the same instant of time a neighbor can switch technology) then it keeps using technology 0, on the other hand if both neighbors use technology 1 it switches to it, on the other hand if it was using technology 1 it switches if both neighbors are using 0 and does not switch if both neighbors use 1. Thus the firm switches technology if both the neighbors disagree (on the technology choice), it does not switch if both agree and switches with probability 1/2 if one agrees and the other does not. The value of the configuration η B1 at site x changes at rate c B1 (x, η), where
Thus from Bramson and Griffeath (1980, p.183) we know that η L is a (nearest neighbor) linear voter model on a one-dimensional lattice 4 .
(ii) η B2 is an interactive particle Markov process evolving on {0, 1} Z . Given A1 and A2 the firm switches if at least N/2 neighbors are using a different technology. The value of the configuration η B2 at site x flips at rate c B2 (x, η), where
The statement then follows from Andjel, Liggett and Mountford (1992, p.74) (iii) by the same argument used in the proof of (ii), by noting that c B3 (x, η) = 1 if #{y : |y − x| ≤ N/2, η x = η y } ≥ N/2 + 1 and 0 otherwise, the statement follows from Durrett and Steiff (1993, p.232) It should be noted that in the linear voter model, each site changes technology at rate proportional to the number of neighbors that disagree, while in the threshold voter the site changes technology if there is at least a given number (threshold) of neighbors that disagree.
Given the facts above, we can now analyze the dynamics and the asymptotic behavior of η B1 , η B2 , η B3 , by borrowing some results already available in the probabilistic literature.
The Dynamics and the Asymptotic Behavior of the Aggregate Technology Process
Under A4, each firm will never change technology when all neighbors use the same technology, a configuration of either all firms using 1 or all firms using 0 is an absorbing state for the system. A first question that we wish to address is whether such configurations will be reached as t gets large. More precisely we address the problem of whether consensus will eventually occur or not, where by consensus we mean that, as t gets large, the probability that two generic sites (firms) use a different technology approaches zero. Thus consensus is a situation in which all sites will eventually agree on the same technology. We shall see below that consensus occurs when either rule B1 or B2 is followed, while consensus does not occur in general when instead rule B3 is followed. Linear and nonlinear (threshold) voter models are non-ergodic, 5 in the sense that the limiting distribution depends on the initial distribution. Several of the propositions stated below, require the initial distribution to be a Bernoulli product measure with density θ ∈ (0, 1), denoted as µ θ , that is µ θ (x : η x (0) = 1, x ∈ Z) = θ, θ ∈ (0, 1). A3 ensures that the initial distribution is indeed a Bernoulli product measure. This means that at time 0 each site uses technology 1 with probability θ and technology 0 with probability 1 − θ, independently of the choices of the other sites. Hence, the system starts from a state of individual independence. The interaction between sites begins at t > 0, when firms, at Poisson random times, start reconsidering their technology choice by observing their neighbors.
We shall see that the voter process is nonergodic and a high value of θ increases the chances that a configuration of all ones will eventually occur. In this case, all positive spillovers are exploited and the aggregate production level is higher. Thus, consensus on technology 1 will be called the "high equilibrium". On the other hand, consensus on 0 implies that no positive spillover is exploited and the level of production is lower. We shall call this the "low equilibrium". Thus if the flip rates 6 are as prescribed by rule B1 or B2, either a high or low equilibrium will eventually occurs, with the former being more likely for higher value of θ. On the other hand we shall see that if the flip rate is prescribed by rule B3, the system in general will not converge to one of the two absorbing states and we shall have an infinite (but countable) number of mixed equilibria, in which both technologies may co-exist.
PROPOSITION 3.2
Let A1-A4 hold, then for any x, y ∈ Z,
PROOF: (i) Given A1 and A2, from Fact 3.1(i) we know that η B1 is a linear voter model with translation invariant initial distribution, the statement then follows from Cox and Griffeath (1986, p.350) .
(ii) Given A1 and A2, from Fact 3.1(ii) we know that η B2 is a threshold voter model with threshold equal to N/2, A3 ensures that the initial distribution is translation invariant (i.e. it does not depend on the specific site), and A4 ensures that configurations of either all 1 or all 0 are absorbing. The statement then follows from Theorem 1a in Andjel, Liggett and Mountford (1992) .
COROLLARY 3.3
Let A1-A4 hold and assume that whenever half of the neighbors use 1 and half use 0, the firm follows either rule B1 or B2. Then the aggregate output will converge in probability to either to the high or to the low equilibrium.
PROOF: A2 ensures that the solution to the expected profit maximization is unique. As firms eventually agree on either technology 1 or 0, either all firm exploit externalities (high output level) or none does (low output level).
We shall show below that consensus in technology choices implies cluster formation. For a cluster in Z we mean a connected segment of sites using the same technology. For cluster size we mean the number of connected sites using the same technology. Hereafter the same argument applies to η B1 and to η B2 , so for the sake of simplicity we drop the superscript. We can now define the mean cluster size around the origin at time t as
where η µ is either the linear or the threshold voter, with initial distribution µ. We shall see below that, when consensus occurs, the mean cluster size grows with t and approaches infinity as t approaches infinity.
PROPOSITION 3.4
Let A1,A3,A4 hold, then, as t → ∞,
PROOF: (i) A3 ensures that the initial distribution is a Bernoulli product measure say µ θ , A1 and A2 ensure that Fact 3.1(i)(ii) hold. As the proof is the same for both η B1 and for η B2 we shall drop the superscript. We say that x is a border for η at time t, if η x−1 (t) = η x (t). A border measure for η(t) is then defined as
The Bernoulli product measure with density θ ∈ (0, 1) is translation invariant (i.e. it does not depend on the specific site) and it is also mixing (for a definition of mixing border measure, see Bramson and Griffeath 1980, p.187-188) . Thus by the Birkoff ergodic theorem a strong law of large number follows, ensuring that with probability one,
As the number of borders and the number of clusters in [−n, n] can differ by at most one, given the definition of mean cluster size, we have that
where the last equality follows straightforwardly from the definition of border at site 1. Now from Proposition 3.2, we know that ∀x, y ∈ Z,
so that by setting x = 0, y = 1, we have that lim t→∞ Pr(η 0 (t) = η 1 (t)) = 0, and the desired result then follows.
(ii) From Theorem 1c in Bramson and Griffeath (1980, p.191) , since any Bernoulli product measure is mixing.
Proposition 3.4 shows that, whenever firms follows either rule B1 or B2, we observe along the dynamics larger and larger areas of firms using either technology 1 (wealthy areas) or technology 0 (poor areas) 7 . As the cluster size, at least for the linear voter, grows at rate slower than t, the clusters seem to be stationary over time. This is consistent with the stylized fact of persistent cross-sectional differences in wealth and output.
Since η B1 , η B2 are non-ergodic processes, their limiting distribution will depend on the initial distribution. In particular, as we shall see below, the limiting distribution is a mixture of pointmass distributions µ 1 , µ 0 , where µ 1 (resp. µ 0 ) denotes a configuration in which all firms use 1 (resp. 0). The weights of this mixture depend on the initial state of the system. Hereafter with µ B1 (t), µ B2 (t) we denote the distribution of the configuration η B1 (t), η B2 (t), respectively, at time t. We have
for some constant, depending on θ, 0 < D(θ) < 1 and increasing in θ. PROOF: (i) Given equation (5), the conditions in Liggett (1985, p.158) are satisfied. Therefore, the assumptions of Corollary 1.13(a) of Liggett (1985, p.231) are satisfied.
(ii) From Theorem 1b in Andjel, Liggett and Mountford (1992) .
Thus from Proposition 3.5 we know that with probability θ, (resp. D(θ)), µ B1 (t), (resp. µ B2 (t)) converges to a configuration of all using 1, and with probability 1− θ, (resp. 1 − D(θ)), µ B1 , (resp. µ B2 ) converges to a configuration of using 0. So the only difference in the limiting distribution of µ B1 (t) and µ B2 (t) lies in the weights of the mixture of pointmass distributions. Thus, economies starting from an higher aggregate level of output have higher chances of converging to the high equilibrium, and viceversa. Moreover, the high equilibrium is more likely for larger values of θ.
Under rule B3, in case of indifference each firm keeps the technology currently in use. 8 In general, in this case the system does not display consensus on one technology. Intuitively, the main difference between the dynamic behavior of η B3 (t) and that of η B1 (t), η B2 (t) is the following: as a firm switches technology only if more than half of her/his neighbors disagree (i.e. if at least N +1 neighbors disagree), any time the site switches, the number of sites in her/his neighborhood that disagree on the technology held by that site, decreases (by one). For this reason we expect that over time, each site switches less frequently than in the other previous two cases. In fact, as we shall see below, any firm can switch technology only a finite number of times. Furthermore intuition suggests that both the technologies will in general survive in the long-run, so that we may have coexistence. For example if N = 2, all configurations characterized by two or more connected sites using 1, followed by two or more connected sites using 0, and so on, are stable over time and can be seen as stationary limiting configurations. In fact, the process admits an entire family of stationary configurations, characterized by the coexistence of technologies, beyond those characterized y consensus (all 1 or all 0). Thus, under B3, we shall have an entire family of equilibrium aggregate output. Two different configurations characterized by the same probability measure over sites employing technology 1 and sites employing technology 0 give rise to different levels of aggregate output, depending on how connected the sites using the same technology are. As configurations with less than N/2 connected strings of either 0 or 1 cannot be stable, we see that the lowest level of aggregate economic activity occurs in a limiting configurations with all 0 (meaning that no negative externalities from neighbours can survive in the long run). We shall see below that, when the number of neighbors is finite, but large, configurations characterized by large relatively homogeneous areas are likely to be observed.
PROPOSITION 3.6
Let A1-A4 hold and assume that tie-breaking rule B3 is adopted. Then each firm switches technology only a finite number of times and the system fixates, that is ∀x ∈ Z, with probability one with Υ 0 < ∞. Let Υ t (x) be the energy at site x, i.e.
We shall show that ∀x ∈ Z, whenever the site flips, the energy at that site drops by a strictly positive amount. For the sake of simplicity, take x = 0. Thus we have:
Note that whenever which is strictly positive as (i) N/2 is a finite integer (ii) α > N/2. Thus we have a strictly positive drop of energy at site 0. The same argument applies to any generic site. Thus as any site drops energy whenever it flips, and the energy at time 0 is finite, it follows that each site can flip only a finite number of times, so that fixation occurs.
Thus when the flip rate is as prescribed by rule B3, as t gets large, both technologies may survive and can co-exist as time gets large. In particular we have infinitely many stationary configurations η f (∞); as we mentioned above for N = 2, configurations as . . . 11001100110011 . . . or . . . 111000111000111 . . . are stationary. 9 For N finite but sufficiently large, even if, in general, we may not have consensus (and hence we may not have clustering), we shall tend to observe large regions characterized by the prevalence of one technology alternated by large regions characterized by the prevalence of the other technology. In fact any configuration characterized by segments of less than N consecutive sites using the same technology, cannot be stable over time, and so cannot be a stationary limiting configuration.
COROLLARY 3.7
Let A1-A4 hold and assume that tie-breaking rule B3 is adopted. Then we shall have infinitely many long run equilibria for the aggregate output.
Finally it is worthwhile to point out that Proposition 3.6 (and hence Corollary 3.7) holds also for the case of a finite population. In fact the proof of that proposition is valid, regardless the number of sites we consider. In particular, as each site can switch technology only a finite number of times, if we have finitely many sites, fixation will occur in finite time.
The case of δ = 1/2
We now focus on the asymmetric case in which
In this case, the characterization of the limiting behavior of the aggregate process of technological choice does not depend on the specific tiebreaking rule adopted whenever a firm is indifferent between the two technologies. Hence, the characterization of firms' behavior while taking adoption decisions is fully described by a., b. and c. in Section 2.3. Asymptotic behavior in the asymmetric case is characterized by the following proposition. 10 PROPOSITION 4.1 Let A1-A4 hold.
PROOF: (i) Define E t the following event: E t = (at time t there is a string of at least Nδ +2 consecutive sites favoring A). Also define τ E = {inf t : E t occurs}. We shall begin by showing that if P (τ E < ∞) = 1 then the desired result follows. For sake of simplicity and without loss of generality 10 The result of Proposition 4.1 is related to the concept of contagion proposed by Morris (2000) , for the case of coordination games. The term contagion refers to a situation in which whenever one action (the risk dominant action) is played by a minimum number of neighbouring players, it will eventually spread out to all the population. In Ellison (1993) , Blume (1995) , and Morris (2000) , the contagion threshold is 1/2 on a one-dimensional lattice. Lee and Valentiny (2000) improve upon this, by showing that, provided the initial distribution is random, the contagion threshold is 1/2 also on a two-dimensional lattice. set δ = 1/3, N = 6, so that Nδ + 2 = 4. Suppose the most unfavorable situations for 1 in which E t may occur, i.e.
. . . 00000000111100000000 . . .
Note that no site using 1 will flip to 0 when has a chance to revise its technology. Now in both cases the two site 0-sites on the immediate left and right of the 1-string, would flip to 1, while the second two immediate 0 on the left and right of the 1 group either will flip to 1 or will not flip. It remains to show that P (τ E < ∞) = 1. A3 ensures that at time 0 each sites employs technology 1 with probability θ and technology 0 with probability (1 − θ). It suffices to show that the event E t , occurs at t = 0, with probability one. We shall consider the case of M firms, lying on −M/2, −M/2 + 1, . . . − 1, 0, 1, 2, . . . M/2 and then let M go to infinity. From a very large urn with a proportion θ of 1-balls (i.e. firms using 1) and 1 − θ of 0-balls we draw with replacement (M/(Nδ + 1)) Nδ + 1-tuple of balls (e.g. if δ = 1/3, and N = 6 we draw 3 balls at once, put them back in to the urn, and repeat the process M/3 times). As the urn is very large, if we draw Nδ + 1 balls consecutively, the chance that the first is say 1 is the same that the second or the third is 1. We proceed as follows: we first draw Nδ + 1 balls and place them on sites −M/2, (−M/2) + 1, . . . (−M/2) + Nδ +1, put the Nδ +1 balls back in to the urn, pick another Nδ +1-tuple, and place them on sites (−M/2) + Nδ + 2, . . . (−M/2) + 2(Nδ + 1), and so on until we have covered all the M sites. The probability of getting a Nδ + 1-tuple of 1s is given by θ Nδ+1 , while 1 − θ Nδ+1 is the probability that at least a ball in the Nδ + 1-tuple is a 0. Hence
(ii) By the same argument used in (i). As a result, whenever δ < 1/2, that is in the case where technology 1 exploits very strong externalities that make it preferable to technology 0 even when few neighbors (less than 50%) adopt it, the system will converge to the (unique) high long run equilibrium aggregate output, regardless of the initial distribution. On the other hand, if δ > 1/2, meaning that in order to make technology 1 preferred to technology 0 a high proportion (greater than 50%) of neighboring firms adopting 1 is needed, then the system converges to the (unique) low long run equilibrium aggregate output, regardless of the initial distribution. In this case no positive externality is exploited.
It should be stressed that the result of this section do not require the Poisson time assumption. Indeed, it would suffice that at each instant of time, one and only one site can revise its technology and that each site has the same chance of revising it. For example, in the case of a finite number of sites, say N, we could have drawn sequentially, and with replacement, one site at time, with each site having probability 1/N each time. However, such a drawing mechanism is not well defined in the case of countable sites and the Poisson assumption is a valid device to ensure that at each instant one and only site can revise its technology.
A small simulation exercise
In this section we outline the findings from a small simulation exercise. We consider a vector of 500 sites located along the real line; the initial distribution is a Bernoulli with parameter θ = (1/4, 1/2, 3/4), that is at time zero each of the 500 sites begins to produce with technology 1 with probability θ. We consider a time span of 500 periods, each period is partitioned in 500 subintervals, so that the discrete approximation error is of order 1/500. Thus, we observe the dynamics of the process over 500 × 500 instants. At each of the 500 × 500 points in time, each site can be drawn with equal probability 1/500, once a site is drawn, (s)he looks at the technology employed by her/his six neighbors, 3 on the left and three on the right, and reconsider her/his technology according to one of the rules outlined in Sections 3 and 4. The site is then put back into the urn, and another draw is performed. Note that sites are drawn with replacement, one at time. Therefore, it is ensured that in each instant of time one and only site is allowed to reconsider her/his position, and that on average each site has drawn once every period, i.e. on average each site will be drawn 500 times. This is a reasonably good approximation to the Poisson times assumption, and clearly suffices for the case of δ = 1/2, in which we do not require Poisson distributed random times. We consider the case of δ = 1/3, δ = 2/3, and δ = 1/2 in conjunction with Rule B1. From the results stated above, in the first case we expect consensus on one, in the second consensus on zero and in the last case consensus on either 0 or 1, with cluster formation. We begin by displaying, the initial distribution when θ = 3/4 (the least favorable case for consensus on zero) and the final distribution when δ = 1/3, confining our attention to the "first" 80 sites. Initial configuration for θ = 1/4 00001000010001001001000010000100000000001000011010000010000000001000000100000110 corresponding final (after 500 × 500 iterations) configuration for δ = 1/3. 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 Analogously, we display, the initial distribution when θ = 3/4 (the least favorable case for consensus on one) and the final distribution when δ = 2/3, confining our attention to the "first" 80 sites. Initial configuration for θ = 3/4 11101111110011101110011111111111111111111001000101111111110001111110011011011011 corresponding final (after 500 × 500 iterations) configuration for δ = 2/3, 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000.
It is immediate to see that in the case of δ < 1/2 (δ > 1/2) converges to consensus on 1 (on 0) is quite rapid, regardless the initial configuration. We now consider the case of δ = 1/2 in conjunction with Rule B1, and report the final configurations corresponding to three different Bernoulli initial distributions. Again, we report only configuration for the "first" eighty sites. δ = 1/2, rule B1, θ = 1/4, 11011100000000101101111100000000000101111101100101000010000001001111000000111111111 δ = 1/2, rule B1, θ = 1/2, 00000001001011010011111000011111100111110001100110010010010110111011111001000111110 and finally, δ = 1/2, rule B1, θ = 3/4, 00001011111111101010010111000000100111111111111101101100100111111111111011101001000.
We see how, the final configurations tends to display clusters of either zeros or ones, though the cluster size seems to grow rather slowly, as, after 500 periods, there are not many clusters of size larger than ten or twelve. Also, as expected, we have predominance of cluster of ones, both in terms of numbers of clusters and cluster size, when θ = 3/4, and the other way round when θ = 1/4.
At this point, one could associate to each technology choice the corresponding output level defined in Assumption A2, and then proceed along the lines of Durlauf (1993, Sections 4 and 5) . Notice that, in the present context, the high level output depends on the actual fraction of neighbors adopting technology 1.
Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a simple model of local interaction between firms producing an homogeneous good. Capital becomes obsolete at random Poisson time, and has an average life equal to one. Whenever capital becomes obsolete, the firm can reconsider its technology choice. We assume a Cobb-Douglas type production function for two available technologies. The returns to Technology 0 are not affected by local spillovers. Technology 1 is more costly, as there is an overhead cost, but it has a higher marginal productivity with respect to the net capital. The superiority of Technology 1 positively and monotonically depends on the fraction of neighbors using it. In particular, δ denotes the minimum fraction of neighbors adopting Technology 1 that make Technology 1 at least as profitable as Technology 0. As such, δ is a measure of the level of complementarities between the two technologies: other things being equal, the lower is δ, the higher is the relative profitability of Technology 1 over Technology 0. We show that the long run properties of the aggregate process of technology adoption and output production depends on the value of δ. When δ = 1/2 we have multiple long run equilibria, in particular we may have consensus on either technology 1 or 0, or we may have coexistence of both technologies. Furthermore for some specifications of the model, we shall observe cluster formation, that is the formation of slowly growing homogeneous areas that look stationary along the dynamics. When δ < 1/2 we have convergence to the high equilibrium, where all firm will eventually use technology 1, while when δ > 1/2 we have convergence to the low equilibrium, where all firm will eventually use technology 0. Thus growth is nonergodic in the case of δ = 1/2 and is ergodic in the case of δ = 1/2.
